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INTRODUCTION 
 
Faced with a seemingly unending decline in its financial picture, Puerto Rico is in 
dire need of a way to avoid an economic catastrophe.1 With a stagnant economy,2 lack of 
industry,3 a rapidly declining population4 (and therefore rapidly declining taxing 
revenue), and a high unemployment rate,5 Puerto Rico has been forced to take drastic 
measures to address its unsustainable financial situation.6 On June 28, 2014, Puerto 
Rico’s governor passed legislation to provide its public corporations7 with debt 
adjustment, under what is essentially Chapter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code 
(“the Code”).8 Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a municipality the opportunity 
to discharge its debts.9 “Municipality” under the Code includes a public agency or 
																																																								
1 John Burnett, Island of Disenchantment, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 11, 2015, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2015/03/11/puerto-ricos-agencies-dont-need-
chapter-9-bankruptcy (“[Puerto Rico] is likely headed toward insolvency.”). 
2 Steven B. Smith et al., Floating Ashore: An Overview of Puerto Rico’s Financial Crisis and Potential 
Restructuring Alternatives, THE BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIST, 31 L. J. NEWSLETTER, June 1, 2014 (“Puerto 
Rico’s economy [ ] has been in decline for several years, hurt by, among other things, the recession…”). 
3 James Surowiecki, The Financial Page: The Puerto Rican Problem, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 6, 2015, at 
22. 
4 Burnett, supra note 1 (A “daily departure of more than 100 Puerto Ricans has taken thousands out of the 
island’s productive workforce in the last few years.”). 
5 See id. (“Puerto Rico’s unemployment rate is over 14 percent.”); AM. BANKR. INST., Moody’s: Puerto 
Rico’s New Debt Law is Credit Negative for Financial Guarantors, Default Now More Likely, (Aug. 2014) 
(“Puerto Rico’s 13.8 percent unemployment rate is more than double the U.S. average.”). 
6 Michael A. Fletcher, Puerto Rico, With at Least $70 Billion in Debt, Confronts a Rising Economic 
Misery, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2013, www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/puerto-rico-with-at-
least-70-billion-in-debt-confronts-a-rising-economic-misery/2013/11/30/f40a22c6-5376-11e3-9fe0-
fd2ca728e67c_story.html. 
7 Zachary H. Smith, Puerto Rico’s Municipal Debt Landscape Continues To Evolve, LAW360 (June 4, 
2014, 4:47 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/544331/puerto-rico-s-municipal-debt-landscape-
continues-to-evolve (“Puerto Rico public corporations include entities such as the Puerto Rico Electric 
Power Authority, Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation 
Authority, and others.”). 
8 See Leonard Weiser-Varon et al., A Close Look at Puerto Rico’s Bankruptcy-Like Legislation, LAW360 
(July 03, 2014, 9:58 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/553454/a-close-look-at-puerto-rico-s-
bankruptcy-like-legislation; see also Aaron Kuriloff, Puerto Rico Power Authority Bond Prices Sink, WALL 
ST. J., June 30, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/puerto-rico-power-authority-bond-prices-sink-
1404162222. 
9 11 U.S.C. §901 (2006) et seq. 
	 3
instrumentality of a state.10  
The main problem with this legislation, claims a suit filed on behalf of Puerto 
Rico’s bondholders, is that the bankruptcy laws, as granted by the United States 
Constitution, are the singular domain of Congress.11 As a United States territory, this 
raises the question of the constitutionality of Puerto Rico passing legislation that 
essentially mirrors the United States Bankruptcy Code.12 Puerto Rico’s Act only allows 
Puerto Rico’s public corporations the right to file bankruptcy, not Puerto Rico itself,13 but 
such legislation directly conflicts with the Bankruptcy Code, which denies both Puerto 
Rico and its municipalities access to the Code. Furthermore, where Congress has 
established a uniform Bankruptcy Code, one that specifically includes Puerto Rico, 
Puerto Rico’s creation of its own bankruptcy legislation creates an unconstitutional 
Supremacy Clause conflict.  
Defenders of the legislation point out that Puerto Rico is not a state and therefore 
is not bound by the United States Code,14 nor is it in conflict with it, since there is not a 
provision on point regarding Puerto Rico’s public corporations.15 However, the claim that 
Puerto Rico is not a state is somewhat confused by the fact that, as a territory of the 
United States, in many respects, the United States treats Puerto Rico no differently than 
																																																								
10 11 U.S.C. §101(40) (2006). 
11 See Maria Chutchian, Puerto Rico’s New Debt Law Usurps Congress, Funds Say, LAW360 (June 30, 
2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/552993/puerto-rico-s-new-debt-law-usurps-congress-
funds-say?article_related_content=1. 
12 Aaron Kuriloff, U.S. Investment Firms Challenge Puerto Rico Restructuring Law, WALL ST. J., June 29, 
2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-investment-firms-challenge-puerto-rico-restructuring-law-
1404068742 (“The act is a bankruptcy law and ‘treads on the Congress’s exclusive province in enacting 
such legislation.’”). 
13 See id. (“The proposed bill . . . doesn’t include a way for the island’s general-obligation bonds and sales-
tax debt to be restructured.”). 
14 See id. (“The island’s Government Development Bank said it stands behind the Public Corporations Debt 
Enforcement and Recovery Act and will defend it. Puerto Rico has a ‘sovereign’s right to pass its own debt 
enforcement statutes in areas not covered by federal law.’”). 
15 See generally Stephen J. Lubben, Puerto Rico and the Bankruptcy Clause, 88 AM. BANKR. L. J. 553 
(2014). 
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the states16 and the United States Bankruptcy Code expressly includes Puerto Rico in its 
definition of a “state.”17 These conflicts are the backdrop of the analysis presented here.  
Part I of this note presents the foundation of this conflict, briefly reviewing Puerto 
Rico’s financial problems, its recently passed legislation, and its relationship to the 
United States. Part II presents an overview of the United States Bankruptcy Code and 
analyzes the constitutionality of Puerto Rico’s legislation. Part III of this note considers 
the path taken by New York City during a time of extreme financial distress in the 1970’s 
and suggests some possible directions that Puerto Rico could take to restructure its 
finances in an attempt to avoid use of the bankruptcy statute.   
 
 
I. BACKGROUND  
 
A) Puerto Rico’s Financial Troubles 
 
The worldwide recession of 2008 hit Puerto Rico especially hard.18 Adding fuel to 
the fire of the greatest economic downturn since the Great Depression was the expiration 
of a tax subsidy in 2006 which enabled American firms doing business on the island to 
earn tax-free income.19 What was already an unsteady economy turned into a downward 
spiral after the subprime mortgage implosion.20 With the majority of banks curtailing 
lending in an effort to clean up their balance sheets, businesses were negatively impacted 
																																																								
16 See generally Adam D. Chandler, Note, Puerto Rico’s Eleventh Amendment Status Anxiety, 120 YALE 
L.J. 2183 (2011). 
17 11 U.S.C. §101(52). 
18 Tim Fitzsimons, Global Recession Hits Puerto Rico Hard, NPR (Jan. 9, 2014, 4:29 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/01/09/260979934/global-recession-hits-puerto-rico-hard.  
19 Lizette Alvarez, Economy and Crime Spur New Puerto Rican Exodus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2014, 
www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/economy-and-crime-spur-new-puerto-rican-exodus.html (“Tax laws that 
were once abundantly generous . . . came to a crash in 2006, after the 10-year phase-out of a subsidy that 
provided American firms operating in Puerto Rico with tax-free income.”). 
20 See id.  
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by the inability to access capital.21 This lack of capital made it difficult for businesses to 
run effectively, thereby creating additional problems as companies that were unable to 
pay their bills began laying off employees.22 With an increase in unemployment, many 
people curtailed their spending, which in turn further depressed the economy.23 With the 
downturn in business, Puerto Rico began to feel the pressure of less tax revenue and its 
increasing debt.24 As the tax revenue was insufficient to cover the commonwealth’s 
budget, Puerto Rico’s government had no choice but to raise rates and taxes.25 With the 
increase in taxes and the lack of employment, many citizens of Puerto Rico fled for the 
mainland of the United States.26 Puerto Rico’s financial picture grew darker as its 
population shrank and its tax base declined,27 leaving the commonwealth unable to 
perform on the debt of its public corporations.28 
Puerto Rico’s financial structure includes three different kinds of debt: the debt of 
its public corporations, general obligation debt (debt that is payable on the general 
income of the commonwealth, not attributable to any one revenue source), and sales tax 
																																																								
21 Eric Dash, Puerto Rican Lenders Face Their Own Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2010, 
www.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/business/30fdic.html?_r=0 (“Loans are scarce, making life even harder for 
many local businesses.”). 
22 See id. (“A lending slowdown of this kind often causes a vicious circle — slower growth, more job losses 
and, in turn, an even sharper pullback in lending.”). 
23 Alan Gomez, Economy’s On Mend, But Puerto Ricans Still Desert Island, USA TODAY, Aug. 11, 2014, 
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/11/puerto-rico-population-loss/13891661/. 
24 See Alvarez, supra note 19.  
25 See id. (“Last year, water rates rose 60 percent in a bid to help cut the state-run water company’s debt.”); 
see id. (“Vowing not to lay off any more workers, he [Puerto Rico’s Governor, Garcia Padilla] raised taxes 
sharply to provide much-needed revenue…”). 
26 See Gomez, supra note 23 (“This island saw a net loss of 144,000 people from 2010 to 2013, the largest 
exodus since a similar period following World War II…”). 
27 Danielle Kurtzleben, “Puerto Rico’s Population Continues Rapid Decline,” U.S. News & World Report, 
Jan. 2, 2014, available at http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2014/01/02/puerto-ricos-
population-continues-rapid-decline. 
28 Lisa Beilfuss, Fitch Cuts Puerto Rico’s Rating Deeper Into Junk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2015, 
www.wsj.com/articles/fitch-cuts-puerto-ricos-rating-deeper-into-junk-1427397508 (“[T]he legislature’s 
“willingness to pay” has become a significant concern.”). 
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debt, (the repayment of which comes directly from sales tax revenues).29 Puerto Rico’s 
public corporations make up a large part of the commonwealth’s economic structure.30 
For many years, Puerto Rico’s main source of capital was obtained by issuing bonds on 
behalf of its public service corporations.31 These public corporations, such as the Water 
and Gas Company and the Utility Company, because of the vital importance they played 
in maintaining a high standard of daily living for the citizens of Puerto Rico, were 
considered cash cows that would sustain the commonwealth’s debt indefinitely. 
However, the economic downturn, the declining population, and the over abundance of 
public debt together created the perfect storm from which Puerto Rico now finds itself 
desperately trying to escape.   
The most pressing of Puerto Rico’s financial concerns is its interest payments on 
nearly $70 billion dollars of debt, 40% of which is made up of the island’s corporate-like 
public entities.32 By comparison, when Detroit filed for bankruptcy in July of 2014, its 
public debts were $18 billion.33 However, the clouds over Puerto Rico’s financial picture 
could lift with the recent passing of new legislation by Puerto Rico’s Governor Alejandro 
																																																								
29 Aaron Kuriloff, Credit-Rating Firms Downgrade Puerto Rico’s Public Agencies, WALL ST. J., June 27, 
2014, www.wsj.com/articles/credit-rating-firms-downgrade-puerto-ricos-public-agencies-1403905253 
(“The bill doesn’t apply to Puerto Rico’s general-obligation or sales-tax bonds, which are backed by the 
island’s taxing authority.”). 
30 BRECKINRIDGE CAP. ADVISORS, PUERTO RICO’S CHALLENGES, 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.breckinridge.com/insights/whitepapers.html?id=1238. (internal citations omitted) 
The Commonwealth’s major public corporations have significant and opaque financial 
relationships to each other and to the Commonwealth. These intra-governmental capital flows 
represent a significant portion of the island’s financial activities, and they are beginning to impact 
the island’s larger issuers. Last year, almost 28% of PREPA’s (Puerto Rico Electric Power 
Authority’s) unpaid bills were owed by delinquent public sector organizations.  
31 See Kuriloff, supra note 29 (“It [Puerto Rico] has financed many of its services through a collection of 
semipublic and semiprivate entities, which are now loaded up with debt and have weakened prospects for 
increasing revenue.”). 
32 See Fletcher, supra note 6; see Kuriloff, supra note 29 (“[L]arge, indebted, corporate-like public entities 
account for almost 40% of the island’s total debt.”). 
33 See Smith et al., supra note 2 (Puerto Rico’s $70 billion debt obligation “dwarfs the approximately $18 
billion debt owed by the City of Detroit.”). 
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Garcia Padillo.34  
B) The Recovery Act 
The Puerto Rico Public Corporations Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act 
(hereafter, the “Recovery Act,” or, “the Act”), signed by Governor Padilla in 2014, in 
effect mimics Chapter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.35 Similar to the 
Bankruptcy Code’s requirement that a municipality be authorized to be a debtor by either 
state law, or by a representative of the state,36 Chapter 2 of the Recovery Act grants debt 
relief to eligible public corporations which are authorized by the Government 
Development Bank of Puerto Rico (GDB).37 Chapter 3 of the Recovery Act requires the 
public corporation debtor to submit a proposed restructuring plan38 and a list of creditors 
who will be affected by the plan.39 As also required by Chapter 9, in order to be approved 
under the Recovery Act, the plan must pass a vote by a majority of the votes cast, and 
“two-thirds of the aggregate amount of affected debt,” of at least one class of affected 
creditors.40 These requirements closely follow the language of Chapter 9 of the Code.41  
II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF PUERTO RICO  
TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS LAWS 
 
A) Federalism and the Bankruptcy Code 
																																																								
34 Leonard Weiser-Varon et al., A Close Look at Puerto Rico’s Bankruptcy-Like Legislation, LAW360 (July 
03, 2014, 9:58 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/553454/a-close-look-at-puerto-rico-s-bankruptcy-
like-legislation	 (“On June 28, Puerto Rico’s governor, Alejandro Garcia Padilla, signed into law 
restructuring legislation that provides a judicial debt relief process in Puerto Rico’s courts for certain public 
corporations…”); see Chutchian, supra note 11. 
35 See Recovery Act, Stmt. Of Motives, §E., (“The Recovery Act is modeled on Title 11 of the United 
States Code (‘the federal Bankruptcy Code’), and particularly on Chapter 9 of that title.”); Weiser-Varon et 
al., supra note 34 (“[T]he legislation is modeled on Chapter 9 and Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 
. . . and is in all practical respects a nonfederal bankruptcy statute.”). 
36 11 U.S.C. §109(c) (2006).  
37 Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, No. 14-1518, 2015 WL 522183, at *2, *2 (D. Puerto 
Rico Feb. 6, 2015) citing Recovery Act §201(b).  
38 Id. at *2 citing Recovery Act §310. 
39 Id. at *2 citing Recovery Act §301(d). 
40 Id. at *2 citing §315(e). 
41 11 U.S.C. §109(c) (2006). 
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One of the primary concerns addressed by the United States Constitution is the 
balance between state sovereignty and the power of the federal government. The Tenth 
Amendment states that all power not granted to the federal government by the 
Constitution is reserved to the states.42 Under Article I of the United States Constitution, 
Congress alone is granted the authority to create the Bankruptcy Code.43 However, this 
does not mean that the states are not allowed to create their own “collective creditor 
regimes”44 based on common law concepts.  
A fundamental aspect of the common law insolvency scheme is the creation of a 
legal structure for the assignment of an insolvent debtor’s assets as an alternative to 
formal bankruptcy proceedings.45 The assignment for the benefit of creditors is a 
voluntary transfer of property by the debtor,46 which is inherent in the ownership of 
property.47 This transfer of property is a common law right that exists independent of 
statute.48 However, this insolvency framework becomes problematic when the debtor’s 
assignment of his assets provides preferential treatment to some creditors at the expense 
of others.49 “Although outside the bankruptcy context, there is nothing wrong in 
preferring certain creditors to others, in the bankruptcy context, preferential transfers are 
																																																								
42 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
43 Alan J. Feld, Note, The Limits Of Bankruptcy Code Preemption: Debt Discharge and Voidable 
Preference Reconsidered In Light of Sherwood Partners, 28:3 CARDOZO L. REV., 1447, 1460-1 (2006) 
citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 4 (“[T]he Constitution’s Bankruptcy Clause sets forth Congress’s power to 
establish ‘uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.’”). 
44 Id. at 1448. 
45 Id. at 1460-1. 
46 Id. at 1448. 
47 Id. at 1449 citing Note, Discharge by Assignment For the Benefit of Creditors, 36 VA. L. REV. 813, 813 
(1950) (“The right of a debtor to make a voluntary assignment for the benefit of his creditors has always 
been recognized as a right inherent in the ownership of property. It does not depend upon statutes, as it 
creates an express trust partaking of the nature of a private contract.”). 
48 Feld, supra note 43, at 1460 citing Note, Statutory Regulation of Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors, 
47 YALE L.J. 944, 945 (1938). 
49 Id. at 1449 (“Typically, statutes regulating general assignments do not permit the assignee to prefer 
certain creditors to others.”). 
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usually considered inequitable because the transfer limits funds that would otherwise be 
shared by similarly situated creditors.”50  
A state’s involvement with creditor transfers, such as assigning a trustee, or  
passing legislation to formalize insolvency procedures, conflicts with the Bankruptcy 
Code to the extent it goes beyond the common law assignments for the benefit of 
creditors51 to provide for a formal structure for the discharge of debt.52 “The presence of a 
discharge provision evidences a ‘true’ bankruptcy statute, and, since 1898, has been 
considered an essential feature of the bankruptcy scheme in the United States.”53 This is 
the central tension between the sovereign power of the states and the reach of the federal 
government under the Bankruptcy Code.54  
The states themselves have never been allowed access to the Bankruptcy Code, 
but the Code was silent on the matter of a municipality claiming bankruptcy until 1934, 
when, in the aftermath of the Great Depression, many municipalities became insolvent.55 
Municipal bankruptcies were problematic for the Code from a Tenth Amendment 
																																																								
50 Id. at 1450 (internal citations omitted). 
51 Id. at 1452 (“[S]ome state statutes might be preempted [by the Bankruptcy Code] if they constitute 
‘complete bankruptcy legislation’ and do not merely codify preexisting common law concepts underlying 
an assignment for the benefit of creditors.”). 
52 Id. at 1451 (stating that the three main Supreme Court cases on which Judge Alex Kozinski in Sherwood 
Partners Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir.)(2005), relied on in determining that the Bankruptcy 
Code preempts the preference avoidance portion of the California state creditor benefit assignment law, 
“stand for the proposition that discharge is the limit of preemption.” (citing Stellwagon v. Clum, 245 U.S. 
605 (1918); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929); Pobreslo v. Joseph M. Boyd Co., 287 U.S. 518 
(1933))).  
53 Id. at 1455. 
54 Feld, supra note 43, at 1452 (citing Nahum L. Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory Under Article 9 
Of The UCC And The Preference Problem, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 49, 59 (1962) (“No invasion by a state law 
affording debtors a discharge will be tolerated.”)(“State laws will be suspended to the extent of actual 
conflict with the Act.”). 
55 Juliet M. Moringiello, “Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy,” 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 
440 (2014) (“Congress enacted the predecessor statute to today’s Chapter 9 in 1934, in emergency 
legislation passed as the United States was recovering from the Great Depression.”); John C. Philo, Local 
Government Fiscal Emergencies and the Disenfranchisement of Victims of the Global Recession, 13 J. L. 
SOC’Y 71, 80 (2011) (explaining that almost 5,000 cities defaulted on their debts during the Great 
Depression).  
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perspective,56 since in order for a municipality to declare bankruptcy, the municipality 
was required to use federal law.57 A municipality granted the right to declare bankruptcy 
by the federal government led to a constitutional conflict between the federal government 
and the state.58 Congress could not grant a municipality the power to declare bankruptcy 
without violating the Tenth Amendment’s protection of the state’s sovereignty.59 
However, a state could not provide its municipalities the right to declare bankruptcy 
based on state statutes because a discharge from debt “could not be enforced against a 
creditor from another state who did not participate in the discharge proceeding”60 under 
the Contracts Clause.61 Over time, the balance of power between the two was delineated 
through case law, as legal challenges became more frequent. 
Congress’ first attempt to create a national municipal bankruptcy scheme in 1936 
was struck down by the Supreme Court in the 1936.62 Congress’ intent in passing the act 
was to bridge the gap between the limitations imposed on the federal courts by the Tenth 
Amendment and limitations imposed on the states by the Contracts Clause.63 In so doing, 
Congress extended the Bankruptcy Code to allow the federal government to oversee the 
																																																								
56 Moringiello, supra note 55, at 451 (The Supreme Court upheld the 1937 bankruptcy statute, known as 
Chapter X, passed by Congress at the center of the case of United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938), 
because it recognized that the statute was “narrowly drawn so as not to interfere with state sovereignty,” in 
deference to “the states’ control over their fiscal affairs.”). 
57 Id. at 451 (The Supreme Court in United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938), “emphasized the policy of 
cooperation implied by the bankruptcy law, explaining that the state ‘invites the intervention of the 
bankruptcy power to save its agency which the State itself is powerless to rescue…’”). 
58 Id. at 451 (citing United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938)) (“[T]hrough the state’s ‘cooperation with 
the national government the needed relief is given.”). 
59 Id. at 451 (citing United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938)) (“[T]he debtor municipality must have 
been authorized by state law to take all action necessary to implement the plan.”). 
60 Id. at 444 (citing Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827)).  
61 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §10, cl. 1. 
62 Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936) (The Act of May 24, 1934, 
added three sections (§§ 78-80) to the Bankruptcy Code, purporting to permit State subdivisions that were 
unable to pay their debts to resort to the federal bankruptcy courts to readjust their obligations as they came 
due.). 
63 Moringiello, supra note 55, at 440. 
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financial restructuring of a state’s municipalities.64 The Supreme Court found this 
extension of power to be akin to the limitation imposed on the states by the Contracts 
Clause.65 In essence, the Court held that the end results, requiring a creditor to take less 
than what he had originally contracted for, which was denied to the states by the 
Contracts Clause,66 could not be achieved by an act of Congress.67 
Congress replaced the first national municipal bankruptcy law in 1937.68 This 
second attempt at a federal municipal bankruptcy structure, known as Chapter X, closely 
mirrored the relationship between the states and the common law insolvency scheme.69 
This approach protected the sovereignty of the states by granting the Bankruptcy Court 
the power to oversee the restructuring of the municipality’s finances only if the debtor 
municipality was first granted authorization by state law.70 Congress made the municipal 
bankruptcy provisions a permanent part of the Bankruptcy Code in 1946.71  
B) Puerto Rico and United States Statehood 
An important question to consider in assessing the constitutionality of Puerto 
Rico’s Recovery Act is whether Puerto Rico should be considered no different than a 
state, and therefore denied the right to access the Bankruptcy Code, or whether as a 
sovereign entity if it is free to make its own laws regarding debt restructuring. 
The United States colonized Puerto Rico after winning the Spanish-American 
																																																								
64 See Ashton v. Cameron Cnty., 298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
65 See id. 
66 Moringiello, supra note 55, at 410 (“The Contracts Clause [ ] prohibits the states from passing laws that 
would force a creditor to accept less than what it is owed on a claim without that creditor’s consent.”). 
67 Ashton v. Cameron Cnty., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936) (“The Constitution was careful to provide that ‘no 
State shall pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.’ This she may not do under the form of a 
bankruptcy act or otherwise. Nor do we think she can accomplish the same end by granting any permission 
necessary to enable Congress so to do.”). 
68 U.S. v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938). 
69 Act of August 16, 1937, 50 Stat. 653. 
70 See Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938); see also Moringiello, supra note 55, at 452. 
71 Kenneth N. Klee, Introduction, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 221, 221 (2012). 
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War in 1898.72  In 1917, Puerto Rico’s citizens became United States citizens73 when 
Puerto Rico became a United States territory after the passage of the Jones-Shafroth Act 
by President Woodrow Wilson.74  Even though citizens of the United States, the citizens 
of Puerto Rico do not have the same rights and responsibilities as American citizens. For 
example, Puerto Rico’s citizens are not allowed to vote in presidential elections, nor do 
they pay federal taxes.75 However, the United States Supreme Court, for the most part, 
treats Puerto Rico as if it were one of the states.  
In the case of Examining Board of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de 
Otero,76 the Supreme Court observed that Puerto Rico could conceivably be considered a 
state and noted its uniqueness: “We readily concede that Puerto Rico occupies a 
relationship to the United States that has no parallel in our history… .”77 More pointedly, 
in the case of Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,78 the Court approvingly 
quoted an observation from the First Circuit that “Puerto Rico has … not become a State 
in the federal Union like the 48 States, but it would seem to have become a State within a 
common and accepted meaning of the word.”79 In the Supreme Court case of Rodriguez 
v. Popular Democratic Party,80 the Court expressly stated that “[i]t is not disputed that the 
fundamental protections of the United States Constitution extend to the inhabitants of 
																																																								
72 Mireya Navarro, A New Debate on the Fate (And State) of Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1989, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/30/us/a-new-debate-on-the-fate-and-state-of-puerto-
rico.html?pagewanted=all. 
73 8 U.S.C. §1402 (2006) (“All persons born in Puerto Rico on or after January 13, 1941, and subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States, are citizens of the United States at birth.”). 
74 Andrew Glass, Puerto Ricans granted U.S. citizenship March 2, 1917, POLITICO (Mar. 2, 2008, 7:42 
AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2008/03/puerto-ricans-granted-us-citizenship-march-2-1917-
008771#ixzz3nWobwqkI. 
75 Id. 
76 426 U.S. 572. 
77 Id. at 596. 
78 416 U.S. 663 (1974).  
79 Id. at 672 (1974) quoting Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 377, 387 (1st Cir. 1953). 
80 457 U.S. 1 (1982). 
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Puerto Rico.”81 The Court even went so far as to say, “[i]n particular, we have held that 
Puerto Rico is subject to the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection 
of the laws.”82  
Of greater concern is whether Puerto Rico’s public corporations qualify as 
municipalities under the Code. The Code defines a municipality as a “political 
subdivision” or “public agency” or “instrumentality of a state.”83 One of the more 
problematic aspects of Puerto Rico’s financial situation is the lack of distinction between 
Puerto Rico and its public corporations, or as The Washington Post referred to them, 
Puerto Rico’s “state-run” corporations.84  
For example, 
[Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority] PREPA is 
governed by a nine member board comprised of the 
Secretary of DTPW, and six members appointed by the 
Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate, and 
two members [who] represent the consumers’ interest 
elected in a referendum carried out by the Puerto Rico 
Consumer Affairs Department. … The Commonwealth 
provides financial support to PREPA through legislative 
appropriations.85 
 
Furthermore, according to one report, “successive administrations turned to the bond 
market to plug gaping budget deficits.”86 If there is no distinction between Puerto Rico 
and its state-run corporations, then how can it be argued that Puerto Rico’s utility 
companies should be allowed to declare bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code, where 
																																																								
81 Id. at 7. 
82 Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
83 11 U.S.C. §101(40) (2006). 
84 Michael A. Fletcher, Can Bankruptcy Save Puerto Rico’s State-Run Corporations?, WASH. POST, Feb. 
26, 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/02/26/can-bankruptcy-save-puerto-ricos-
state-run-corporations/.  
85 JESÚS F. MÉNDEZ RODRÍGUEZ ET AL., P.R. TREASURY DEP’T, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL 
REPORT 73 (2011). 
86 Fletcher, supra note 6.  
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Puerto Rico is prohibited from using the Code, when in effect they are mere extensions of 
the sovereign itself?87 Municipalities like Detroit and New York City were separate 
entities with politically appointed governing bodies, separate and apart from the state. 
The same cannot be said for the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA).88  
Although the Bankruptcy Code provides for an instrumentality of the state to 
declare bankruptcy under its definition of a municipality, similar to its treatment of 
Puerto Rico, the Code flat-out denies Puerto Rico’s municipalities from seeking debt 
adjustment pursuant to Chapter 9.89 No matter how Puerto Rico’s financial structure is 
analyzed, Puerto Rico90 and its municipalities91 are denied reorganization protection 
under Chapter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.  
C) The Recovery Act and The Supremacy Clause 
Another important issue to consider in determining the constitutionality of the 
Recovery Act is whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts Puerto Rico’s legislation. Article 
4, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, known as The Supremacy Clause, states 
that the Constitution is the Supreme Law of the land.92 As such, where Congress has 
written a law under authority of the Constitution, a state may not write a law to the 
																																																								
87 See Lubben, supra note 15. 
88 Puerto Rico Power Authority Restructuring Plan To Aim At Consensus-Donahue, REUTERS (Sept. 17, 
2014), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/18/usa-puertorico-prepa-donahue-
idUSL1N0RJ03N20140918 (“Donahue's [a newly hired restructuring expert] actions are subject to 
approval by PREPA's board, which is dominated by government appointees.”). 
89 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R., No. 14-1518, 2015 WL 522183, at *2, *2 (D. Puerto Rico Feb. 6, 
2015). 
90 11 U.S.C. §101(52) (“The term ‘State’ includes the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, except for the 
purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title.”). 
91 Franklin Cal. at *2 (citing 11 U.S.C. §101 (52)) (“Puerto Rico municipalities are expressly prohibited 
from seeking debt adjustment pursuant to Chapter 9.”). 
92 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land…”). 
	 15
contrary.93 Federal law may preempt state law 1) expressly, 2) by implied occupation of a 
field, or 3) by implied exclusion of conflicting state regulation.94  
When Congress acts within constitutional limits, it 
may expressly preempt state law. Field preemption occurs 
when the federal regulatory scheme is so ‘pervasive’ that it 
would be a reasonable inference that Congress left no room 
for the States to supplement it. Finally, as for conflict 
preemption, where the federal government, in the exercise 
of its superior authority in a field, has enacted a complete 
scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard . . 
. states cannot, inconsistent with the purpose of Congress, 
conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal 
law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.95 
 
Although Congress’ jurisdiction to create the Bankruptcy Code is directly 
delegated to it by the United States Constitution, set forth in Article I, Section 8, Clause 
4,96 it is widely recognized that it was not Congress’ intent to preempt the field.97 On the 
contrary, it is critical for an effective national bankruptcy scheme that the Code work in 
conjunction with state sovereignty.98 The limit of state power in the realm of municipal 
bankruptcy is the establishment of the priority of the municipality’s creditors. State 
sovereignty, with regards to the enactment of insolvency statutes, does not permit states 
to determine whether a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding will be repaid. The power to 
discharge debt belongs solely to Congress.99 The Act however, ignores such state 
																																																								
93 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (“…and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 
261, 265 (1929) (“States may not pass or enforce laws to interfere with or compliment the Bankruptcy Act 
or to provide additional or auxiliary regulations.”). 
94 Feld, supra note 43, at 1462 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. 
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-4 (1983)). 
95 Feld, supra note 43, at 1462 (internal citations omitted). 
96 U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 4. 
97 See Moringiello, supra note 55.  
98 Moringiello, supra note 55, at 452 (“The Court emphasized the policy of cooperation implied by the 
bankruptcy law, explaining that the state ‘invites the intervention of the bankruptcy power to save its 
agency which the State itself is powerless to rescue,’ adding that through the state’s ‘cooperation with the 
national government the needed relief is given.’”) (citing U.S. v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938)) . 
99 Feld, supra note 43, at 1462. 
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restrictions by going beyond a common law bankruptcy scheme to provide a debtor with 
a way to fully discharge its debts. 
The District Court case of Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico100 
addressed the legality of Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act based on the consolidated 
complaints of Puerto Rico’s public corporation bondholders.101 The plaintiffs in Franklin 
California made a Supremacy Clause claim, as well as a Contracts Clause claim and a 
Takings Clause claim.102 Regarding the plaintiff’s Supremacy Clause claim, the Court 
held that in its passage of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress expressly preempted state law 
to the extent that it binds non-consenting creditors.103  
The plaintiff’s Contracts Clause claim stems from Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 
of the United States Constitution, which prohibits states from interfering in the 
contractual agreements between private parties. The bondholders in Franklin California 
claimed that the Recovery Act violates the Contracts Clause by impairing the contractual 
obligations imposed by the Authority Act and the Trust Agreement, contractual 
obligations entered into by the public corporations with its debt holders.104 The court held 
that Section 903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits states from passing laws that adjust 
or discharge financial agreements between private parties which require a creditor to 
accept an amount less than is owed under his agreement with the debtor.105 
Under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, The Takings 
Clause forbids the federal government from taking private property for public use without 
																																																								
100 No. 14-1518, 2015 WL 522183 (D. Puerto Rico Feb. 6, 2015). 
101 Id. at *3. 
102 Id. at *3. 
103 Id. at *12. 
104 Id. at *3. 
105 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R., No. 14-1518, 2015 WL 522183, at *13 (D. Puerto Rico Feb. 6, 
2015). 
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just compensation to the owner.106 This same provision is applied to state and local 
governments by the Fourteenth Amendment under the Due Process Clause.107 In Franklin 
California, the plaintiffs claimed that the Recovery Act allows Puerto Rico to take the 
plaintiff-bondholder’s contractual right to seek the appointment of a receiver and their 
right to liens on Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority’s revenues without just 
compensation in violation of the Takings Clause.108  
Although its ruling is certain to be appealed, the District Court ultimately found 
the Recovery Act to be unconstitutional as a violation of both the United States 
Constitution’s Supremacy and Contracts Clauses.109 As for the right of Puerto Rico’s 
public corporations to claim bankruptcy protection, the Court devoted exactly one 
sentence to this concern, stating flatly, “Puerto Rico municipalities are expressly 
prohibited from seeking debt adjustment pursuant to Chapter 9.”110  
 
III. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR PUERTO RICO’S FISCAL PROBLEMS 
 
Regardless of whether the Recovery Act is ultimately held to be unconstitutional, 
the commonwealth will still need to address its financial problems. This section explores 
the ways other municipalities have addressed similar fiscal crises and considers which 
options might provide a workable solution for Puerto Rico.  
Beyond the question of the constitutionality of the Act, the problem with the 
solution put forth by Puerto Rico lies in the fact that Puerto Rico itself is an interested 
																																																								
106 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
107 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
108 Franklin Cal. at *2, *3. 
109 Id. at *3. 
110 Id. at *3. 
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party.111 Being an interested party to a reform plan is not necessarily an indication of a 
failure to create a workable plan,112 but the lack of oversight is troubling.113 Since Puerto 
Rico has a vested interest in eliminating its public corporations’ debts without being 
required to make any changes, Puerto Rico’s passage of the Recovery Act provides a 
solution which lacks hope for any significant reform.114 By contrast, when New York 
City faced a substantial financial crisis in the 1970’s,115 even though Chapter 9 had been 
amended specifically to make it easier for a municipality of New York’s size to enter into 
bankruptcy, New York City declined to use it.116 Instead, the state legislature established 
the Municipal Assistance Corporation, which placed the city’s finances under the 
supervision of a control board, which included state officials.117  
In all likelihood, the debts of Puerto Rico’s public entities will become the burden 
of Puerto Rico, and from a creditor perspective it might be difficult to distinguish 
between Puerto Rico and its public corporations going forward. As it currently stands, the 
																																																								
111 In re City of Detroit, Mich., 504 B.R. 97, 172-3 (2013) (Congress added a requirement to chapter 9 – 11 
U.S.C. §109(c)(5) – that a debtor must have attempted a pre-bankruptcy good-faith negotiation with its 
creditors before it is eligible to use chapter 9.); Moringiello, supra note 55, at 419 (“The Moral Hazard” 
argument). 
112 Mario H. Lopez, Republicans Abandoning Principles in Bailout for Puerto Rico, THE DAILY CALLER, 
(Mar. 30, 2015), http://dailycaller.com/2015/03/30/republicans-abandoning-principles-in-bailout-for-
puerto-rico/ (“Puerto Rico has a mind-boggling $73 billion in debt that has no chance of being repaid 
because there is no political will to undertake the budget cuts, pension reform, and tax policy overhaul that 
is necessary.”). 
113 Matt Wirz et al., Puerto Rico, Investors Enlist Ex-IMF Officials, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2015, 
www.wsj.com/articles/puerto-rico-investors-enlist-ex-imf-officials-1428878228 (“The Commonwealth 
needs to commit to developing a comprehensive plan that balances the budget with timely and transparent 
financial reporting.”). 
114 See Moringiello, supra note 55, at 415 (Unlike Chapter 9, under which only the debtor may propose a 
plan of adjustment.). 
115 Adam Lisberg et al., Fiscal Crisis in 1975 Taught New York Hard Lessons of Chopping, Freezing That 
Are Handy Now, NY DAILY NEWS, Feb. 3, 2009, www.nydailynews.com/news/money/fiscal-crisis-1975-
taught-new-york-hard-lessons-chopping-freezing-handy-article-1.388460. 
116 Moringiello, supra note 55, at 418 (quoting Michael W. McConnell et al., When Cities Go Broke: A 
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 472 (1993)) (“Both New York 
and Cleveland experienced significant difficulties ‘due in large part to municipal mismanagement,’ and 
neither one resorted to Chapter 9 to resolve its problems.”). 
117 Id. at 38. 
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credit rating of some of Puerto Rico’s public corporation’s bonds have already been 
reduced to junk status by the credit rating agencies.118 From an investor’s perspective, it 
is not an unnatural conclusion to think that the inability of Puerto Rico’s public 
corporations to honor its financial obligations would extend to Puerto Rico itself.119 Even 
if the Recovery Act is ultimately struck down as being unconstitutional, rebuilding Puerto 
Rico’s credit rating will not be easy.120 
The following scenarios represent possible approaches Puerto Rico could use to 
restructure its finances without resorting to the use of the Bankruptcy Code.  
Approach 1: United States Bailout 
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the United States government bailed out 
947 companies totaling $613 billion in disbursements.121 It is clear from the size of this 
list that the idea of the United States government bailing out failing institutions after the 
economic meltdown is not out of the realm of possibility. Entities on this list of recipients 
include Chrysler, GM and Citibank, to name just a few.122 One positive aspect of a 
government bailout, in addition to the immediate financial relief, is that in providing 
significant financial backing, Congress often makes demands that changes be 
																																																								
118 See Kuriloff, supra note 29 (“Moody’s Investors Service this week dropped its rating on about $8.8 
billion in bonds from the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority to Ba3 from Ba2, both junk grades…”).  
119 Michael Corkery, Puerto Rico’s Indebted Power Utility Adds to Island’s Problems, DEALBOOK, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/puerto-ricos-indebted-power-utility-adds-to-
islands-problems/?_r=0 (“While Puerto Rico officials insist the government’s debt remains 
sacrosanct, Moody’s Investors Service downgraded the commonwealth’s general obligation rating further 
into junk status on Tuesday, saying the Recovery Act “marks the end of the commonwealth’s long history 
of taking actions needed to support its debt. It signals a depleted capacity for revenue increases and 
austerity measures, and a new preference for shifting fiscal pressures to creditors.”). 
120 Larry McDonald, Could a Puerto Rico Default Hammer the $3.7 Trillion U.S. Muni Bond Market in 
2014?, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymcdonald/2014/01/03/puerto-rico-default-
to-re-price-the-3-7-trillion-municipal-bond-market-in-2014/2/ (“Once investor confidence is lost, it’s like 
losing personal trust, and becomes almost impossible to get back.”). 
121 Bailout Tracker: Bailout Recipients (Detailed View), PROPUBLICA, available at 
http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list/simple (last visited Apr. 28, 2015). 
122 See id. 
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implemented to help safeguard its investment.123 These demands for changes take the 
difficult – and often politically unpopular – decisions necessary for the restructuring 
process out of the hands of, in the case of a municipality, elected officials who need voter 
approval to stay in office.124 This approach allows those in charge to make the changes 
necessary to restructure without fear of losing their jobs. Unfortunately, this method 
denies voters the opportunity to have a say in the process, at least until the next election. 
In the aftermath of the 2008 downturn, a great deal has been written about the 
government bailout of private and semi-private companies at the expense of taxpayers.125 
Another interpretation of the government bailouts is that they were shrewd investments in 
companies when their shares were trading at historically low prices.126 One such example 
was the government bailout of Fannie and Freddie Mac. Created by the United States 
government to help provide home mortgages to the middle class,127 Fannie and Freddie 
Mac were largely considered by investors to be backed by the full faith and credit of the 
																																																								
123 See David Goldman, Congress Demands Answers On Bailout, CNN-MONEY (Dec. 10, 2008), 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/10/news/economy/bailout_oversight_hearing/index.htm (“Rep. Maxine 
Waters, D-Calif., demanded to know why Treasury has not adopted a plan put forth by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corp. to use bailout funds to directly help mortgage holders. ‘You don't have a comprehensive 
plan to deal with foreclosures [and] until you do, please don't come here and ask for another penny - I will 
work 24 hours a day to make sure you don't get another dime.’”). 
124 See Martin Sullivan, The Obama Administration’s Backdoor Bailout of Puerto Rico, FORBES (Jan. 28, 
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2014/01/28/the-obama-administrations-backdoor-bailout-
of-puerto-rico/ (alluding to the fact that actions have consequences, especially for politicians)(“Without 
committing itself to a legal position, Treasury has provided certainty that has enabled Puerto Rico to raise 
taxes in the most politically painless way imaginable.”). 
125 See Hester Pierce, The Real Cost of the 2008 Bailouts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 14, 2012, 
12:15 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/03/14/the-real-cost-of-the-
2008-bailouts; Mark Gongloff, Bailout Costing Taxpayers Billions, TARP Watchdog Reports, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Jan. 30, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/30/bailout-cost-
taxpayers_n_2576057.html; Martin Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; 
Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122156561931242905.  
126	Joe Light, Treasury Department: Fannie, Freddie Bailout Wasn’t a Loan, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2015, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/2015/04/21/treasury-department-fannie-freddie-bailout-wasn't-a-loan/ 
(“The bailout wasn’t a loan, but an investment on which taxpayers are now being compensated.”).	
127 Binyamin Appelbaum, Without Loan Giants, 30-Year Mortgage May Fade Away, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 
2011, at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/business/04housing.html 
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United States.128 On the verge of bankruptcy in 2008, the federal government took both 
companies under receivership.129 The government helped keep the companies afloat by 
offering a $187.5 billion loan.130 Today, that entire loan has been paid back and Fannie 
and Freddie are on their way to being profitable again.131 The same can also be said of the 
federal bailout of both GM and Chrysler.132 Similarly, with regards to Puerto Rico’s 
public corporations, if the federal government provided the capital necessary to help 
restructure their outstanding debts, it could be another opportunity to buy a company’s 
debt at rock-bottom prices with the potential for future profits.  
Although the government was willing to bailout once-great companies like 
Chrysler and GM, it has rarely shown the same willingness to do so for a municipality,133 
even for three of the nation’s largest – Detroit, Washington, D.C., and New York City. 
																																																								
128 MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, RS22950, FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC IN 
CONSERVATORSHIP (2008) (“the market has long believed that Fannie and Freddie debt was ‘implicitly’ 
guaranteed by the government…”). 
129 Matthew Frankel, The Government Might Leave Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Alone, THE MOTLEY 
FOOL (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/04/17/fannie-mae-and-freddie-mac-
might-stay-in-conservat.aspx (“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are both under government conservatorship as 
a result of the bailouts given during the financial crisis.”). 
130 See Light, supra note 127 (“After getting taken over by the U.S. government, mortgage-finance 
companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac took a bailout of about $187.5 billion.”). 
131 See id. (“To date, the companies [Fannie and Freddie] have paid the government more than $228 billion, 
$40 billion more than they took in the bailout.”). 
132 Damon Lowney, GM, Chrysler Bailouts Saved 2.6 Million Jobs, AUTOBLOG.COM (Dec. 10, 2013, 1:01 
PM), http://www.autoblog.com/2013/12/10/gm-chrysler-bailouts-saved-money-jobs/ (“[T]he US Treasury 
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2013, www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-gm-bailout-cost-20131209-story.html (“As the federal 
government gets ready to sell the last of its shares in General Motors Co., a research institute has calculated 
the final bill on the auto industry bailout and says that taxpayers were net winners,” when looked at from 
the perspective of the effect of the bailout on the overall economy.); but see Eric Beech, U.S. Government 
Says It Lost $11.2 Billion on GM Bailout, REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2014), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/30/us-autos-gm-treasury-idUSBREA3T0MR20140430 (“The U.S. 
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loss includes a write-off in March of the government's remaining $826 million investment in "old" GM, the 
quarterly report by a Treasury watchdog said.”). 
133 See Fletcher, supra note 6 (“Officials in San Juan and Washington are adamant that a federal bailout is 
not on the table, but the situation is being closely monitored by the White House, which recently named an 
advisory team to help Puerto Rican officials navigate the crisis.”). 
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Detroit, Michigan, once famous for being the home of the Big Three auto 
manufacturers, had been on a steady decline for decades as a change in consumer 
preference for foreign made cars accelerated during the mid-1980s.134 Unable to stem the 
tide against it after the 2008 recession, Detroit found itself unable to pay its bills after its 
residential and business entities were largely abandoned.135 Nowhere in the public 
discourse about how to turn around the finances of this once great city was the suggestion 
of a government bailout;136 and none was ever provided.  In 2012, Detroit was allowed to 
declare bankruptcy and is the largest United States city to ever do so.137 
In the early-nineties, Washington D.C. faced its own fiscal crisis.138 In attempting 
to help get Washington back on its feet, Congress passed the District of Columbia 
Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995.139 “The Act created a 
financial control board to oversee the finances of the District of Columbia and granted the 
board the power to override decisions made by the District of Columbia’s mayor and city 
council.”140 It is important to note that D.C., similar to Puerto Rico, is not a state, nor is it 
a municipality.141 Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code requires a state to authorize a 
municipality to access the Code.142 Because Washington D.C. is not a municipality or a 
																																																								
134 See Anatomy of Detroit’s Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2013, at 
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State, Congress was able to create the control board to oversee the restructuring of its 
finances.143 Significantly though, although Congress was instrumental in helping to 
establish a financial restructuring plan for D.C., it did not provide a bailout.  
As for New York City, a headline from 1975 referring to President Ford’s 
resistance to helping New York City with its fiscal crisis of that time seems to sum up the 
government’s perspective on municipal bailouts. The headline read, “Ford to City: Drop 
Dead.”144 With this history in mind, it is highly unlikely that the Congress will provide 
such assistance to Puerto Rico,145 but never say never.146  
Approach 2: Creditor Negotiations 
 From the most basic perspective, Puerto Rico’s use of its Recovery Act could be 
seen as “the nuclear option.”147 That is to say that its use would completely wipe away all 
of the debt of its public corporations, but it would also completely wipe away all of the 
equity of its bondholders. This is a very drastic move that would have far reaching 
effects.148 Although much more difficult, negotiating with creditors in an attempt to find 
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143 See Smith et al., supra note 2. 
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a solution that takes the needs of both sides into account is the smartest approach. As 
helpful as it may appear to immediately eliminate the financial pressure the 
commonwealth currently faces, the after shock would be so great that the repercussions 
would be felt for years to come, in ways that could prove equally painful. A compromise 
obtained via a dialogue with its creditors on the other hand will not provide immediate 
and absolute relief, but neither will the after-effect be quite so painful either.149 A good 
example of this approach comes from New York City’s financial crisis of 1975.    
 In the fall of 1975, New York City’s finances were on the brink of collapse.150 
After years of more affluent city-dwellers relocating to the suburbs, New York City 
found itself in precisely the same predicament Puerto Rico is currently facing. The 
defections of high-income earners to the suburbs left New York City with a diminished 
tax base, a seemingly insurmountable amount of debt due to a changing economy, and a 
commitment to a large number of social programs for a city that could no longer afford 
them.151 When reviewing news reports from that time, what is most striking, and most 
glaringly absent from the reports regarding Puerto Rico’s current situation, is the struggle 
between New York City and its creditors to find a workable solution.152 Significantly, the 
Bankruptcy Code requires debtors seeking Chapter 9 protection to negotiate for a “good 
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faith” settlement with its creditors as a prerequisite for declaring bankruptcy.153 Yet, in 
the articles written about Puerto Rico’s financial troubles, little has been mentioned about 
the efforts Puerto Rico has taken to renegotiate with its creditors.154 
 Although New York City’s brush with bankruptcy was difficult for those who 
lived through it, the approach used to rescue the city’s finances without claiming 
bankruptcy,155 or receiving a government bailout,156 provides a still relevant blueprint for 
today’s fiscal crises. Among the approaches that Puerto Rico might consider in 
renegotiating its debts without claiming bankruptcy is to alter the terms of the repayment. 
If the debt that comes to maturity this year could be restructured so that the payments are 
reduced to close to zero now, but then gradually increase over the life of the debt, it 
would give Puerto Rico some space to breathe by providing it more time to turn its 
financial situation around, while also making sure its creditors are still made whole. On 
the interest payment side, when an interest payment comes due, instead of requiring the 
interest payment to be paid now, if the interest is added to the principal amount due on an 
on-going basis, again, this would provide enough breathing room to help Puerto Rico get 
back on its feet, but does not allow it to completely escape its financial obligations.  
 Another option might be to split each share into two. The first new share having 
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the original coupon and maturity date, the second newly created share having the original 
coupon, but not being payable until after the first round of shares are completely paid off, 
thereby reducing the amount of interest due immediately. This is not ideal, but it is far 
better than having the obligation being wiped away completely. Another option could be 
a compromise between the parties that would reduce the amount of debt, without altering 
share amount or the maturity of the debt. Obviously, this is the least attractive option for 
creditors, but it might be the best option to replace a worse-case scenario where otherwise 
all shareholder equity would be eliminated.  
 In some sovereign debt situations, there have on occasion been bondholders who 
refuse to go along with the negotiated compromise, suing for specific performance 
instead.157 In the case of Elliot Assocs. v. Banco de la Nacion,158 a holdout bondholder 
sued Peru, during its 1983 financial crisis, in order to enforce the judgment of an earlier 
case, Pravin Banker v. Banco Popular del Peru,159 against the sovereign for not honoring 
the terms of its debt issuance.160 In Pravin, Peru tried to restructure its debt by eliminating 
its bondholder-creditors and then tried to raise new capital by issuing more bonds.161 The 
holdout debt holder, hedge fund Elliot Associates, sued Peru for its attempt to restructure 
its finances at the expense of its creditors. The court found in favor of the Elliot 
Associates, who then sued Peru to enforce the Pravin ruling in the United States, as well 
as many other jurisdictions.162 The United States court issued an attachment order against 
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payments on Peru’s new debt offering in the amount of $55 million.163  
 To bypass the risk of attachment in New York, Peru 
sought to use Euroclear, in Brussels, to make the planned 
payments. But Elliot had filed an attachment order there as 
well. And although the initial request for the ex parte 
injunction in Brussels was denied, the Court of Appeals 
reversed and granted the injunction. At this point, Peru 
faced the risk of defaulting on its Brady bonds [the new 
issuance], which in turn would have triggered cross-default 
provisions and accelerations in its other bonds. To avoid 
this sequence of events, Peru paid Elliot $56.3 million in an 
out-of-court settlement.164  
 
 Two important lessons can be gleaned from Peru’s financial crisis. The first is 
that, from the United States to Brussels, contractual obligations are not to be taken 
lightly. Secondly, as attractive as it may seem to a struggling entity, claiming bankruptcy 
is neither an easy solution, nor a sure thing.165  
 
IV. THE COST OF BANKRUPTCY 
 
Significantly, the legislation passed by Governor Padillo stops short of allowing 
Puerto Rico itself from using the statute to restructure its general obligation bonds.166  
However, it would be in Puerto Rico’s best interest for long-term growth to avoid use of 
this law.167 The most prudent path that Puerto Rico can take is to restructure the finances 
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of its public corporations so as to not destroy its investors’ equity, thereby protecting its 
good will.168 The issuance of debt has been a significant source of capital for the 
sovereign.169 Many investors who purchased Puerto Rico’s public corporation’s debt did 
so for its triple-tax exempt status,170 but also because municipal bonds were thought to be 
less risky than other investments.171 Traditionally, such investors were retirees seeking to 
gain income from their investments,172 rather than growth.173 Many retirees purchase 
municipal bonds for the payment of dividends as a form of income replacement.174 As it 
currently stands, mutual funds are the biggest holders of Puerto Rico’s triple tax-free 
bonds.175 For Puerto Rico to eliminate its income payment on its debt, or to eliminate its 
debt altogether would be devastating to these investors, which would greatly damage 
investor confidence in Puerto Rico. Once investor trust in Puerto Rico is destroyed, that 
faith will not be easily regained and the cost of raising capital will increase 
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dramatically.176 It cannot be overstated how drastic a measure it is for a municipality to 
claim bankruptcy.177  
Although the main focus of a bankruptcy claim will, by its nature, be centered on 
the numbers, there is also the “moral hazard” component to consider as well.178 The 
moral hazard in bankruptcy is the tendency of debtors to neglect their repayment of debts 
to devote resources to their own interests,179 resulting in not only the destruction of its 
shareholder’s equity, but their trust as well. Damaging investor confidence is not only 
harmful to the debtor,180 but also affects the larger economy. When investors’ equity is 
destroyed, the ill will left in its wake creates a destabilizing force, not just for the debtor 
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in the capital markets, but for the flow of capital in general.181 The good will of investors 
is critical to an efficient market, which in turn is a vital component to a productive 
economy. Investor confidence is as critical to the financial structure of both a business 
and society as a balanced asset sheet.182 Bankruptcy should be seen a last resort.  
  
CONCLUSION 
Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act represents the usurpation of Congress’ singular 
authority to allow for the discharge of debt under the Bankruptcy Code, in violation of 
the Supremacy Clause. Regardless, there is a strong chance that Puerto Rico will be able 
to relieve itself of the burden of its debt, simultaneously destroying its creditors’ 
equity.183 However, doing so is not in Puerto Rico’s best interests.  The most prudent 
approach would be to find a way to be pay back the debt that is owed, without completely 
eliminating it. This article has illustrated a number of approaches that could be used to 
address Puerto Rico’s fiscal crisis. No matter which approach Puerto Rico ultimately 
chooses, it is clear it will not be without pain for all parties involved.  
																																																								
181 See Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407 (2002). 
182 Burnett, supra note 1 (“[Puerto Rico’s creditors] will be more likely to help in the island’s recovery if 
they do not feel shortchanged.”). 
183 Andrew Scurria, House Bill Would Open Up Ch. 9 To Puerto Rico Public Cos., LAW 360 (Aug. 01, 
2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/563298/house-bill-would-open-up-ch-9-to-puerto-rico-public-cos 
(Even if the Recovery Act is found unconstitutional, Puerto Rico’s representatives are working hard to find 
other methods of relief for Puerto Rico. A non-voting member of the U.S. House of Representatives, Pedro 
Pierluisi, introduced legislation to allow Puerto Rico to access Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 
similar to Detroit and San Bernardino, California.); see id. (“Municipal debt experts told Law360 that the 
law might well pass…”). 
